Ukraine needs air defences, not procrastination

The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase in recent weeks, as Russia has intensified its airborne assault on targets within the country. Particularly concerning is the sharp increase in the use of ballistic missiles and Ukraine’s lack of interceptors to counter the threat at scale. Ukraine’s allies must think creatively and collaboratively now to provide the systems needed and build on the war’s shifting momentum.

While Russian advances and territorial gains on the frontlines have been stalling, largely due to Ukraine’s highly effective drone warfare, Putin now appears to shift to a strategy that seeks to break the Ukrainian spirit through arbitrary attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, with an increasingly deadly toll on the civilian population. President Zelensky has rightly called out this “ballistic terror”. Some estimates suggest that Russia fired at least 126 ballistic missiles at Ukraine in July, compared to only about 200 to 300 such missiles in all of 2024.

The primary reason for Ukraine’s struggle to intercept is that US stockpiles of critical Patriot missile defence has been dwindling, largely due to the ongoing conflict with Iran. Some estimates suggest that the US may have less than 800 Patriot missiles left, down from an arsenal of more than 2300 when the war started. Nevertheless, President Zelensky explained this week that purchasing just 10 percent of the current US Patriot stockpile would allow Ukraine to “destroy all the Russians’ ballistic missiles.”

To address the shortfall, Ukraine has proposed that it could ramp up domestic production of Patriot systems under US-approved licensing. This is a sensible proposal, and I hope the US Government will overcome defence industry concerns to eventually grant a license for at least partial production in Ukraine.

But setting up a licensed production will take months. It won’t deliver what is needed now. In the meantime, other allies must step up, particularly those nations that hold Patriot stockpiles without facing great risk of having to use them for any purpose soon.

Several countries, like Germany and Spain, have already answered the call, but more could be done. Others are limited by constitutional constraints that bar the export of weaponry to countries at war.

One solution, already practiced to a limited extent, is what is known as a backfill mechanism, or a triangular exchange. Countries unable to deliver directly to Kyiv could sell their Patriot systems to other allies who will then have greater capacity to share their own stockpiles with Ukraine. This has already been implemented between Japan and the US, and South Korea is using a similar mechanism for artillery ammunition. The process must be taken to greater scale now, and the existing examples show that it can be done without violating existing no re-export clauses or other arms transfer restrictions.

Acting now, and decisively, is in the West’s best interest. We know that Putin’s imperial ambitions won’t end with Ukraine. At the same time, Russian frontlines casualties are increasing. Putin’s war economy is contracting, and thanks to Ukraine’s capacity to strike critical infrastructure deep inside Russia, most Russians are beginning to feel the impacts. A continued, slow burning war of attrition only plays into Putin’s hand. Equipping Ukraine to gain the upper hand on missile defence would severely limit Russia’s options and strengthen Ukraine’s opportunity to force Putin to the negotiating table. After four and a half years of brutal aggression, we should all support that.